


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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Soviet Concern Over Bangladesh

The Soviets are concerned about the shaky internal situation in Bangladesh, particularly the emergence of political forces they think sympathize with Peking. The South Asian expert in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yury Filipov, told an American embassy officer last week that the internal situation in Bangladesh had deteriorated significantly since the release of political prisoners jailed under former President Mujib. Filipov specifically pointed to members of the National Socialist Party (JSD), who he alleged are "very pro-Peking." He accused the extreme leftists of the JSD of exacerbating tensions in the army through the creation of "revolutionary committees." Despite his concern over the "influence of Maoist elements," Filipov maintained that the recent coups and countercoups were inspired by "personal rivalries" and were not the result of instigation by outside forces.

Filipov expressed concern about the fate of Soviet specialists in Bangladesh. Moscow has experienced some difficulty in contacting Soviet nationals in the south. Several Soviet geologists working in the area between Dacca and Chittagong have not been heard from since November 8.

Filipov made positive comments about former President Mushtaque who he said seemed to be "operating behind the scenes" to overcome internal chaos. Filipov speculated that Mushtaque would very probably be heard from soon. The Soviet press was muted on Mushtaque at the time of his takeover, but clearly he is beginning to look better in comparison to other Bangladesh leaders.

Filipov also expressed dismay over the extent of anti-Indian and anti-Soviet sentiments which have surfaced during the troubles. He said Indian intervention was not likely, but he would not be drawn out on the question of whether India might intervene

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under such circumstances as a massive influx of refugees.



Soviet reporting in recent weeks has implied support for a more active Indian policy toward Bangladesh. *Pravda* commentator Veniamin Shurgin wrote Sunday that left-wing extremist groups have stepped up their activities in promoting anti-Indian and anti-Soviet feeling through the use of Maoist slogans. He stated that if these forces were not rebuffed, the "democratic gains" of Bangladesh would be endangered. *Izvestia* also carried two articles last week highly critical of the regime's failure to halt the activities of right-wing clerical and left-wing Maoist factions.

This coverage did not accord with India's own more circumspect treatment of Bangladesh, but in recent days New Delhi has been coming around to a more negative view of events there.

Despite Moscow's strong propaganda line, official Soviet policy has undergone little change since the coups. Filipov stated that Moscow will continue to trade with and provide some economic assistance to Dacca, although he acknowledged that these efforts are insignificant in light of the country's enormous problems. (SECRET NOFORN/NO-CONTRACT)



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Czechoslovakia: Choosing Sides!

The party daily *Rude Pravo* last Friday added a new fillip to Prague's continuing attack on Maoism by asserting that it is the duty of the entire communist movement to take sides against Peking.


Two signed commentaries set the tone of the unusual full-page assault by describing Peking's foreign policy as fomenting tensions and opposing detente. The catalog of Chinese sins includes breaking ranks with the revolutionary movement and becoming a "factual ally of imperialism," thus making the problem of Maoism the "concern of all peoples." The attack is punctuated with photos of the Chinese ambassador in Santiago engaging in friendly conversation with Chilean strong man Pinochet and of Mao shaking hands with Franz-Josef Strauss.

The centerpiece of the article consists of 56 quotations from more than 50 communist parties, all of which support the thesis that the anti-Maoist controversy is not merely between the Soviets and Chinese, but between the Chinese and the entire communist movement. The leaders quoted range from Brezhnev and Husak to an unidentified representative of the Communist Party of Lesotho.

The attack came on the heels of the deadlocked preparatory session of the European Communist Party Conference (ECPC) and may have been intended in part to isolate the more independent-minded participants. The Yugoslav, Romanian, Spanish, San Marino, Swiss, Greek, Cypriot, and Irish were conspicuously absent from *Rude Pravo's* list. Their insistence that anti-Chinese polemics have no place at an ECPC has been one of the obstacles to convening the conference. A quote from Italian party leader Berlinguer is given pride of place, apparently in order to give the impression that

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Italian communists have resolutely taken sides against the Chinese. This, however, appears a gross misrepresentation of the Italian party's position, and could well draw answering fire. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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TOP SECRET UMBRA
First Signs of Delays
at Soviet Grain Ports

The Soviets are beginning to experience delays in handling grain imports. [REDACTED] up to one month delays in unloading grain at Leningrad, Novorossiysk, and Riga. Less lengthy, but persistent delays are occurring at other Black and Baltic Sea grain ports. As Baltic operations slow down with the onset of adverse weather, Black Sea port congestion is likely to increase.

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Given the magnitude of Soviet grain imports, delays are inevitable. We still believe that these problems are transitory--similar conditions existed during 1973--and that the USSR will be able to handle up to 36 million tons of imported grain annually, an amount exceeding the foreign purchases probable for this crop year.

The most important factors contributing to congestion at Soviet ports are:

--Rail car shortages at dockside. The Soviets have adequate numbers of rail cars to move imported grain inland, but management and scheduling problems are causing delays. In addition, inadequate storage facilities, both at ports and inland, aggravate the rail car shortages.


--Labor shortages at the ports. At the Black Sea port of Poti, for example, stevedore crews are divided between ships, and, as a result, unloading time is greatly increased.

The delays being encountered by individual ships vary considerably mainly because the Soviets are attempting to minimize their foreign exchange costs. For example, US ships--which earn a higher demurrage

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fee after 30 days under the latest US-USSR working agreement on grain shipments--are not encountering serious unloading delays. Soviet ships are also turned around expeditiously to conserve foreign exchange and meet plan commitments. On the other hand, chartered third-flag ships are waiting as much as 30 days for discharge. Demurrage penalties or added time chartering fees for these ships are currently at low levels.

To reduce demurrage payment further, the Soviets are liberally implementing a provision in the US-USSR shipping agreement allowing for adverse weather. When rain, squalls, or other adverse weather occurs, the Soviets designate the affected port closed, although actual discharging operations continue. This ploy allows the Soviets added credit toward demurrage payments.



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Food Shortages in Romania

Although the regime has been generally successful in its efforts to increase food supplies, major shortages persist, particularly in areas hit by the disastrous floods last July. Rumors of discontent and in some cases violence are continuing to make the rounds.

The following account from a resident of Cluj, Romania's third largest city, is an example of reports reaching the US embassy in Bucharest.

There is still almost no food available in the market. More and more people are adopting life style of eating in canteens rather than wasting time standing in lines to buy high-priced, fourth-rate produce. My friend knew of no recent public demonstrations. He related a story about a riot in a shopping center on the outskirts of Cluj which occurred 3-4 weeks ago. People had been standing in line from 3:00 a.m. to buy oil. When the store opened at 7:00 a.m. the manager announced he had only 24 bottles available for sale. The crowd became furious, surged into the store, and started smashing up the premises. When the manager began to fight back, the crowd turned on him. He was rescued by the police and taken to a hospital. He died four hours later. According to my friend this event was covered in a local Cluj newspaper.

A second outburst took place at another housing development 48 hours later. Four policemen, seriously injured, were carted off to the hospital before the crowd could be brought under control.

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Cluj is predominantly Hungarian, and its residents have long claimed that Bucharest discriminates against them. Indeed, a frequent complaint has been the lack of consumer goods and foodstuffs compared to other parts of the country. This normal discontent has undoubtedly heightened since the floods. We still cannot confirm stories from other areas of violence and death related to food shortages. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)



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